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Reflectivity, reflexivity, reflexivism: 
IR’s “reflexive turn” – and beyond 
Inanna Hamati-Ataya 
European Journal of International Relations (2013) 19(4):669-694 
Abstract 
The notion of “reflexivity” has been so intimately tied to the critique of Positivism 
and Empiricism inIR that the emergence of post-Positivism has naturally produced the 
anticipation of a “reflexive turn”in IR theory. Three decades after the launch of the 
post-positivist critique, however, reflexive IR hasfailed to impose itself as either a 
clear or serious contender to mainstream scholarship. Reasons for thisfailure include 
the proliferation of different understandings of “reflexivity” in IR theory that 
entailsignificantly different projects and concerns for IR scholarship; the equation of 
“reflexive theory” with“critical” and “emancipatory theory” and the consequent 
confusion of ethical/normative issues withstrictly epistemic/theoretical ones; and the 
refusal to consider reflexive IR as a “research programme”concerned with empirical 
knowledge, not just meta-explanation. The development of reflexivity in IR theory as 
a sustainable cognitive and praxeological effort is nonetheless possible – and still 
needed.This paper suggests what taking the “reflexive turn” would really entail for IR 
Introduction: 
In his 1989 article on the ‘Third Debate’ in International Relations (IR), Yosef Lapid 
(1989:249-50) noted, after Mervyn Frost (1986:11), that ‘[f]or many years the 
international relations discipline ha[d] had the dubious honour of being among the 
least self-reflexive of the Western social sciences.’ This diagnosis was shared by many 
scholars who thought it necessary to start reflecting on the epistemic and theoretical 
premises that subtended the discipline’s predominant narratives on world politics. The 
critique of Positivist (American) IR scholarship has therefore naturally produced the 
anticipation of a ‘reflexive turn’ (Neufeld 1991) in IR, and in the early 1990s the view 
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was that ‘the prospects for the development of theoretically reflexive international 
relations theory [were] real and significant, while the need for such theory [was] 
urgent’ (Neufeld 1991:2).  
 With the emergence and development of a sustained and coherent meta-
theoretical critique of Positivist IR, “reflexivity” has, indeed, gained a substantive 
visibility in IR debates and literature ((Cox 1996[1981], 1996[1985]; Hoffman 1987; 
Keohane 1988; Lapid 1989; Linklater 1992; Neufeld 1993, 1995; Jackson 2011) and 
developed into a more or less explicit core theme of post- or anti-Positivist IR (Fierke 
2002; Guillaume 2002; Smith 2002, 2004; Hendershot 2004; Agnew 2007), more 
specifically within Critical (Cox 1996[1981], 1996[1985]; Linklater 1992; Cutler 
1999), Constructivist (Hopf 1998; Wendt 1999; Guzzini 2000, 2005; Lezaun 2002; 
Drulàk 2006; Pouliot 2007; Steele 2007c; Lynch 2008), Feminist (Carver, Zalewski, 
Kinsella and Carpenter 2003; Tickner 2005, 2006; Ackerly and True 2008), and 
Pragmatist (Widmaier 2004) approaches. Although reflexivity has been mainly 
addressed from a theoretical, meta-theoretical or specifically epistemic-normative 
perspective, recent “reflexive scholarship” has also been increasingly concerned with 
the importance and practical meaning of “reflexivity” for empirical IR research 
(Guzzini 2005; Ackerly and True 2008; Lynch 2008; Hamati-Ataya 2011), which 
suggests that there is some belief among post-Positivist IR scholars that reflexivity 
can lead to an alternative research program capable of producing a different 
knowledge of world politics, and also of generating cognitive growth in the traditional 
sense of the term.  
While a review of the literature points to the significance the notion of 
reflexivity has acquired in contemporary (non-mainstream) IR scholarship, it also 
reveals that, not unlike other central thematics of “third debate” literature, the 
“reflexive turn” has failed to translate into a clear and appealing alternative to 
Positivism, and therefore remains located at the margins of the margins of the 
discipline. Not only does “reflexive scholarship” seem to be incapable of moving 
beyond the explication of what the “turn” entails, it also seems to have lost the 
momentum and impetus of the “turn” itself, with the proliferation of different 
perspectives on reflexivity that only appear to converge into a common epistemic, 
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normative, or empirical project. As a result, reflexivity finds itself diffused into a 
general dissident literature that has failed to make a decisive impact on the discipline, 
thereby giving the impression that the “turn” is either still on-going, or not really 
worth taking at all. This current state of affairs only serves to reinforce the old 
scepticism about the relevance of post-Positivist IR to empirical research (Keohane 
1988). 
The paradox, then, is that on the one hand, reflexivity has undeniably been 
developing in the work of specific IR scholars, for whom the notion still makes sense 
both as a serious epistemic stance, and as a long-term academic project, but on the 
other, has failed to produce the kind of cognitive impact that is expected or hoped for 
by its main proponents. From the perspective of “reflexive scholarship,” the effort to 
assess the output of the “reflexive turn” in IR is worth making at this particular point 
in the history of the discipline. This paper attempts to identify at least some of the 
problems and obstacles that have prevented it from developing into a sustained 
research program or “paradigm” in the general disciplinary sense of the term . Before 1
doing so, it is important to contextualize the meaning of the “reflexive turn” in IR by 
identifying the general pattern of reflexive scholarship across the social sciences. 
Apart from the specific context that characterizes IR as a socio-historically 
defined field of cognitive production, there is nothing unique about the intellectual 
emergence of “reflexivity” in its literature. As was the case in other social sciences, 
“reflexivity” appeared at a moment when Positivism’s epistemic premises were 
challenged by different types of historicist analyses of knowledge. The main targets of 
the “reflexive critique” are Positivism’s adherence to “truth as correspondence,” its 
understanding of knowledge as “representation,” and its separation of subject and 
object, and of facts and values. Against these core Positivist epistemic stances, the 
 The paper adopts an internalist approach, focusing on the community of “reflexive” scholars and the 1
body of literature that promotes “reflexivity,” either implicitly or explicitly, and does not touch upon 
the external obstacles to the development of the reflexive project within IR. These are more generally 
related to the constraints imposed by the discipline’s doxa, which continues to favour Positivism, and 
as such, undermines the development of a reflexive “disposition” among IR scholars, let alone the 
promotion of the meaning and relevance of reflexivity for IR scholarship. For a more sociological and 
reflexive understanding of how reflexivity itself is located within IR, see Hamati-Ataya (2011b).
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“reflexive turn” was meant to signify IR’s awareness of the historicity of knowledge, 
and of the inherently normative or ideological nature of IR’s underlying theoretical 
premises, modes of theorizing, and scholarly ethos. Converging with Critical Theory’s 
commitment to adopt a ‘perspective on perspectives’ (Cox 1996[1981]), reflexive IR 
scholarship naturally endeavoured to re-assess the foundations of theory and therefore 
delved into meta-theory as a higher order of discourse that was necessary for 
problematising and deconstructing the choices made at the theoretical level of inquiry 
(Neufeld 1993, 1995). Converging with Constructivism’s commitment to reveal the 
connections between representations of social reality and the social production of 
knowledge, it naturally delved into the sociology of knowledge as a way of making 
explicit and understanding the social conditions for the production of validity and 
meaning within IR (Guzzini 2000, 2005; Lezaun 2002).  
Reflexivity similarly imposed itself in other social sciences that underwent 
similar critiques of Positivism, such as Sociology (Gouldner 1970, 1973; Giddens 
1984; Bourdieu 1990; 2004; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and Anthropology/
Ethnography (Garfinkel 1967; Briggs 1970; Scholte 1974; Belmonte 1979; Sangren 
1992[1988], 2007). It was also the subject of an important debate in the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge (SSK), which was itself the product of a “constructionist turn” 
in the Sociology of Science (Bloor 1976; Barnes 1977; Gruenberg 1978; Woolgar 
1988a, 1988b, 1993[1988]; Ashmore 1989; Doran 1989). In fact, IR has a lot to learn 
from the discussions on reflexivity that preoccupied SSKers in the 1980s, and from 
SSK’s own “reflexive turn,” which led to the development of creative modes of 
writing informed by critical ethnography and discourse analysis (Gilbert and Mulkay 
1984; Mulkay 1984, 1986; Woolgar 1988b; Ashmore 1989), but which eventually led 
to the extinction of the problematique of reflexivity and its abandonment in favour of 
the more pressing challenges of empirical knowledge.  
A review of IR reflexive literature points to the likelihood of seeing IR 
reproduce just this pattern: after a somewhat sustained, albeit disciplinarily marginal, 
concern for and dedication to reflexivity, IR scholars might end up relegating 
reflexive scholarship to the abstract realm of meta-theory, with no real translation of 
this fundamentally different way of theorizing into the realm of empirical knowledge. 
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This paper will therefore attempt to identify these obstacles that may prevent reflexive 
IR from efficiently producing the kind of reflexive project that establishes reflexivity 
as a sustainable alternative in the study of world politics, thereby also highlighting 
IR’s potential in leading the revival and development of reflexivity in other social 
sciences where the debate has ended inconclusively. The “reflexive turn,” then, is here 
assessed according to an optimal, rather than a minimal, definition of what an 
academic “turn” is expected to achieve, that is, not merely ‘some sort of cognitive 
interruption within a research tradition,’ or a mere ‘turn away’ from its alternatives 
(Nolan 2007) – Positivism in this case – but a real move toward a properly new, stand-
alone tradition defining an independent epistemic-praxical commitment for IR 
scholarship. 
“Reflexivity,” What? 
A reader unfamiliar with post-Positivist IR theory or with the intellectual and praxical 
concerns of scholars evolving at its margins will find it difficult to make sense of the 
IR literature dealing with the oft-used but nonetheless tricky concept of “reflexivity.” 
Even a scholar who has spent some time working on this concept will have some 
trouble navigating within this literature, a review of which is likely to identify at least 
five important reasons why “reflexivity” is so widely diffused in post-Positivist IR, 
but so confusing to both the initiated and the uninitiated. 
The first problem that faces a reader of “reflexive” scholarship is 
terminological ambiguity, as a quick review of the literature is likely to stumble upon 
a substantially large range of variations on the terms “(self-)reflection” and 
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“(self-)reflexion.”  An obscure combination of these may even be found in one single 2
text, such as in Ackerly and True (2008), who refer to ‘reflexivity’, ‘self-reflexivity’ 
and ‘self-reflection’ all at once, without explaining the differences among these terms. 
It seems, in fact, that these are so obviously inscribed in everyday, ordinary language 
that their various authors rarely feel the need to define them, even when “reflexivity” 
– or another variant of it – constitutes a central theme of their inquiry and argument. 
One may therefore argue – perhaps in a Positivist, Durkheimian or Baconian way – 
that the lack of distance from ordinary language contributes to the large palette of 
terminological uses, which is itself explained by the dual meaning the term “reflect” 
has in the English language, since it defines both the passive act of manifesting 
something or bouncing something off a surface and the active act of thinking about – 
reflecting on – something. This, in turn, explains why “reflective” and “reflexive” 
appear to refer at times to operations that are independent of the subject of 
knowledge, but at others to operations that are performed by the subject herself. It 
also explains why some scholars feel no need to add the prefix “self-” to signify the 
self-referential nature of reflexivity, which they view as embedded in the notion itself. 
 These differences are also “reflected” in the fact that the terms “reflective” or 
“reflexive” are used to qualify a wide variety of “things,” which adds a confusion as 
to what a “reflexive ontology” is supposed to look like or what distinguishes the 
ontological concerns of “reflexive scholarship” from those of other academic 
 For example: ‘reflective’ (Hoffman 1987; Keohane 1988; Adler and Haas 1992; Linklater 1992); 2
‘self-reflective’ (Hoffman 1987; Hopf 1998; Steele 2007c; Ackerly and True 2008); 
‘reflexive’ (Neufeld 1993, 1995; Cutler 1999; Guzzini 2000, 2005; Rasmussen 2001; Fierke 2002; 
Tickner 2006; Pouliot 2007; Steele 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Tickner and Tsygankov 2008; Hamati-Ataya 
2010, 2011a); ‘reflexivity’ (Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1993, 1995; Hopf 1998; Cutler 1999; Guzzini 2000, 
2005; Guillaume 2002; Fierke 2002; Widmaier 2004; Hendershot 2004; Tickner 2005; Pouliot 2007; 
Steele 2007a, 2007b, 2007c; Ackerly and True 2008; Lynch 2008; Tickner and Tsygankov 2008; 
Hamati-Ataya 2010, 2011a); ‘self-reflexivity’ (Lapid 1989; Carver, Zalewski, Kinsella, Carpenter 
2003; Sterling-Folker and Shinko 2005; Ackerly and True 2008); ‘reflectivist’/‘reflectivism’ (Adler 
1997; Patomäki and Wight 2000; Smith 2002); ‘reflexivist’/’reflexivism’ (Hamati-Ataya 2011a); ‘self-
reflection’ (Hoffman 1987; Smith 2004; Steele 2007c; Ish-Shalom 2008; Ackerly and True 2008); ‘self-
consciously reflective’ (Tickner and Tsygankov 2008); ‘self-consciously reflexive’ (Shani 2008). 
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traditions.  That the term “reflexive/reflective” can refer to subjects as much as to 3
products of knowledge, and to mechanisms as much as to subjects of actions makes it 
more difficult to identify the empirical realm of reflexivity. Sometimes, a significant 
disjunction between ‘reflexive’ and ‘reflexivity,’ as in Fierke (2002), where 
‘reflexivity’ seems to refer to scholarship, whereas ‘reflexive’ refers to actors, 
illustrates the fact that these terms are often used with no consistent, or consciously 
chosen, underlying epistemic/ontological frame of reference.  
More important perhaps is the fact that “reflexivity” itself is subject to 
interesting variations that locate it within different, and often separated, realms of 
inquiry. Reflexivity is thus often used to characterize an ontological dimension of 
social practice – as in the ‘reflexivity of the self and society’ (Hopf 1998) – but one is 
equally likely to read about ‘epistemological reflexivity’ (Widmaier 2004), 
‘theoretical reflexivity’ (Neufeld 1991; Hendershot 2004), or ‘ethical 
reflexivity’ (Lynch 2008). This indicates that there are different “reflexive” traditions 
involved (see Marcus 1998), but often not consciously identified with respect to one 
another. One should not, in principle, be surprised to find that reflexivity can be a 
characteristic of epistemic, ontological, theoretical, and deontological standards and 
frames of reference for IR scholarship. In fact, one of the arguments of this paper is 
that the “reflexive turn” indeed should simultaneously impact all these levels/
dimensions of scholarly inquiry, for it otherwise would not lead to a coherent and 
independent tradition as Positivism clearly is. But the problem is that the relationship 
among these different dimensions has not yet been clearly identified or spelled out, at 
least not in an explicit and rigorous way. 
Related to this point is the fact that “reflexive scholarship” in IR is inspired by 
a substantial variety of disciplinary and intellectual traditions in philosophy and the 
 For example, ‘reflective reason’ (Hoffman 1987); ‘reflective approaches’ (as opposed to ‘rationalistic’ 3
ones – Keohane 1988, and following Keohane, Adler and Haas 1992), but also ‘reflectivist approaches’ 
(Adler 1997); ‘reflective analysis’ (Linklater 1992); ‘reflective procedures’ (Linklater 1992); ‘self-
reflective critical inquiry’ (Hopf 1998); ‘reflexive modernity’ (Guzzini 2000; Rasmussen 2001); 
‘reflexive praxeology’ (Rasmussen 2001); ‘reflexive security’ (Rasmussen 2001); ‘reflexive 
loops’ (Guzzini 2005); ‘reflexive understanding’ (Tickner 2006); ‘reflexive discourse’ (Steele 2007a); 
‘reflexive monitoring of actions’ (Steele 2007b); ‘reflexive realism’ (Steele 2007c); ‘reflexive theorists’ 
(Steele 2007c).
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social sciences, that IR audiences are not necessarily familiar with. While Frankfurt 
School scholarship will likely inform the accounts of Critical IR Theorists (Hoffman 
1987, Linklater 1992, Neufeld 1993), Feminist, Constructivists and other post-
Positivist IR scholars freely refer to Frankfurt-style hermeneutics (Tickner 2005, 
Lynch 2008), or to the works of Pierre Bourdieu (Pouliot 2007, Eagleton-Pierce 2009, 
Hamati-Ataya 2010, Leander 2002), Anthony Giddens (Steele 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), 
Ulrich Beck (Rasmussen 2001), or Roy Bhaskar (Patomäki and Wight 2000). And one 
can also find combinations of two or more of these traditions within the same IR texts 
dealing with reflexivity (e.g., Guzzini 2000, 2005). Given that authors like Bourdieu 
or Bhaskar are themselves interpreted differently by IR scholars, the reference to a 
common theoretical genealogy for the concept of reflexivity does not guarantee better 
understanding or communicability across these interpretations . 4
Finally, it is necessary to point to a more general problem that perhaps 
explains all of the above-mentioned observations. What seems to underlie the great 
variety of uses of the term/conception of reflexivity in IR scholarship is the fact that 
reflexivity is either generically and minimally construed as a form of self-awareness 
of one’s own scholarly “perspective,” or conceptualized in a more maximalist way as 
a methodological self-critique operating through an epistemic or theoretical “bending 
 Paradoxically, the more sophisticated IR scholars’ meta-theoretical approaches to reflexivity are, the 4
greater the degree of contention over their interpretations of these different authors. A good example is 
provided by a comparison of Patrick Thaddeus Jackson’s (2011) and Colin Wight’s (2006) analyses of 
Bourdieu’s sociology, which are themselves based on a different categorisation of epistemic-
ontological claims. Whereas Wight finds Bourdieusian ontology to be akin to Critical Realism, Jackson 
identifies reflexivity (including Bourdieu’s) as a ‘monist transfactualism,’ that is opposed to Critical 
Realism as a ‘dualist transfactualism.’ These important differences undoubtedly complicate things for 
IR’s general audience, which needs to be able to make sense of the whole meta-theoretical literature – 
and make some clear choices vis-à-vis it – before it can assess what “reflexivity” means and does in IR 
theory and research. 
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back” of one’s thought . These differences can be assessed through a review of recent 5
autobiographical/autoethnographic works in IR (Brigg and Bleiker 2010; Dauphinee 
2007, 2010; Doty 2004, 2010; Inayatullah 2011; Löwenheim 2010). These appear to 
be a uniform manifestation of “reflexive scholarship,” but in fact differ significantly 
from one another, depending on whether they are informed by Post-Colonial, 
Feminist, or Constructivist IR, and whether they engage the “critical ethnographic” 
turn that is at the origin of a very diverse range of scholarship within autoethnography 
itself (Ellis and Bochner 2000). Not only does autoethnography mean different things 
for the IR scholars who have started developing it , the kind of reflexivity that is 6
manifested or “performed” in autobiographical/autoethnographic accounts is 
fundamentally different from what a Bourdieusian, Giddensian, or Critical-
Theoretical reflexivity entails in epistemic and ontological terms (see Neumann 
2010). While this point cannot be fully addressed within the limits of this paper, it is 
worth suggesting that proponents of reflexivity in IR seriously reflect on these 
differences, for the simple fact that taken in its minimalist form, reflexivity as self-
awareness is unlikely to establish a solid post-Positivist alternative in the discipline. 
One should indeed remember that Behavioralism itself was, in this minimalist sense, 
the result of a properly critical and “reflexive” attitude vis-à-vis “bias” in research, 
 In this sense, it is not clear that “reflexivity” can practically be identified as a single conceptual 5
epistemic-ontological category of IR scholarship, as Jackson does when he classifies all ‘reflexivists’ as 
‘monist transfactualists’ and then expects them to offer a coherent ‘monist transfactualist’ account of 
world politics. The latter expectation, in other words, is reasonable only for some, rather than all, 
‘reflexivists’ identified by Jackson, which in this paper corresponds to a “maximalist” understanding of 
reflexivity. The following sections dealing with Critical Theory and Constructivism, then, are more in 
line with Jackson’s own recommendations, but do not restrict such reflexivity to ‘monist 
transfactualism,’ thereby acknowledging a greater variability of epistemic-ontological commitments, 
i.e., different kinds of Reflexivisms, and consequently, the need to consider whether reflexivity cannot 
in fact be differently categorised – but providing an alternative to Jackson’s categories is beyond the 
physical and analytical capacity of this paper. 
 Compare, for example, Dauphinee’s (2010) and Doty’s (2010) views on the purpose of 6
autoethnography in IR with Inayatullah’s (2011a) and Löwenheim’s (2010). 
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but one that led to a greater commitment to Positivism rather than to reflexivity as it is 
understood by its more radical proponents .  7
These different observations, individually and jointly, should give a sense not 
only of the variety of conceptions of reflexivity one can find today in the IR literature, 
but perhaps also of the reasons why the “reflexive turn” seems so familiar as a “turn 
away from” but at the same time so difficult to identify as a clear “move toward.” A 
more detailed and exhaustive review of reflexivity in contemporary IR literature is 
likely to reveal an even greater diversity of positions, or an even greater lack of 
conceptualisation of what reflexivity entails at the epistemic, ontological, theoretical, 
and deontological levels of inquiry. Having alerted the reader to the great diversity 
and lack of consistency that currently characterizes scholarly references to reflexivity 
in IR, I now turn to a meta-theoretical exercise that focuses, for analytical purposes, 
on the body of literature wherein reflexivity is more explicitly and consciously 
conceptualised as a feature of IR theory and research, namely, Critical and 
Constructivist IR. The purpose of the following sections, then, is to explore a 
“maximalist” rather than a “minimalist” conceptualisation and praxis of reflexivity, by 
reflecting on how epistemic, ontological, theoretical and deontological reflexivity 
should be developed to move the discipline beyond the “turn away” from Positivism 
and “toward” a Reflexivist tradition. 
The Hegelian Thread 
Although reflexivity becomes an explicit concept of Western social science research 
in the last three decades of the twentieth century, it finds its roots in nineteenth-
century European (Continental) Epistemology, more specifically in the thought of 
Georg W.F. Hegel (1977[1807]). Against the Anglo-Saxon, Foundationalist 
 Behavioralist scholars’ commitment to “value-freedom” was originally grounded in their awareness 7
of the possible influence of bias in political analysis. In this sense, Positivism is the result of a 
minimalist “reflexivity.” In the case of Behavioralists, this “self-awareness” was translated into a total 
denial of any self-referential dimension in Positivist scholarship, while in the case of non-Positivist 
scholars, the same minimalist reflexivity is translated into “self-reference,” of which autobiographical 
IR is a good illustration.
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Epistemology of the Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian theory of knowledge, which rests on 
the theory of correspondence and representation, Hegelian thought asserts the 
historicity of knowledge, truth and reason. Deprived of the epistemic certainty 
associated with the notions of objectivity, representation and truth, post-Hegelian 
European social thought started moving away from normative discussions of 
epistemology (i.e., away from the three central “problems” of classical Epistemology, 
namely, “what are the nature, sources and limits of human knowledge?”), toward 
historical and sociological analyses of the conditions of the production of knowledge 
(both in terms of validity and meaning), thereby problematising the relationship 
between the nature of the social world as we observe it, and the socio-historical 
conditions that make it appear as a given order. 
 It may be argued that most of post-Positivist schools of thought that currently 
populate the social sciences, including IR, have branched out from Hegelian thought, 
attempting different interpretations and resolutions of the main problematiques that 
Hegel identified with respect to the nature, meaning, and validity of historical 
knowledge. Most accounts of Reflexivity in the social sciences and IR can therefore 
be traced back to these Hegelian roots (For a detailed account of the reflexive 
component of different post-positivist theories, see Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000)). 
But the different epistemic, ontological, and normative premises proposed by different 
reflexive post-Positivist approaches translate into significantly different projects for 
IR theory and IR generally. I will focus here on Critical Theory and Constructivism to 
highlight these important differences, and then show the limits of the “reflexive turn” 
in both schools of thought. 
The Critical-Theoretical View 
An obvious development of the Hegelian problematic of historical knowledge is 
found in Marx and Engels’ Historical Materialism, which, despite its inherently 
Positivistic appraisal of social reality and history, produced a central concept that is at 
the origin of the problematique of reflexivity in contemporary Marxist-inspired 
thought, namely, the concept of Ideology. Through this concept, Marx and Engels 
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articulated the link between extant representations of reality, and the conditions that 
make reality appear as a given objective order. The notion of Ideology has, however, 
created an important epistemic and theoretical problem for Marxist scholars, that of 
defining the relationship between Ideology – understood as a distorted form of 
consciousness – and Historical Materialism – understood as a superior explanation of 
historical development. If all forms of knowledge are ideological manifestations of 
materialist (socio-economic) structures and relations of conflict and domination, then 
Historical Materialism itself should be subjected to a Historical Materialist or other 
type of socio-historical analysis (Mannheim 1936). If, on the other hand, Historical 
Materialism represents a superior – i.e., “true” – analysis of historical development, 
then its superiority should be based on some third-order, meta-theoretical or epistemic 
frame of analysis that is external to it. 
 The concept of Ideology therefore creates a reflexive problem for Marxist 
thought – it begs the question of self-referentiality. This problem was more explicitly 
addressed in Frankfurt School Critical Theory, which retained the centrality of 
Ideology while emancipating it from its underlying Positivist theory of knowledge. 
From a Critical-Theoretical viewpoint, the solution lies in embracing reflexivity as a 
core epistemic stance of Critical Theory, which distinguishes itself from Traditional 
Theory precisely by its acknowledgment of the historicity of knowledge and of the 
inscription of knowledge in social interests (Horkheimer 1976[1937]; Habermas 
1972). These two components lead to two important consequences for Critical 
Theorists. The first is that Critical Theory necessarily entails a self-referential 
discourse, or, as Robert Cox put it, an account of its own existence: it is both inside 
and outside of itself, both subject and object of knowledge. This explains why 
reflexivity is first identified as a meta-theoretical requirement of social analysis 
(Neufeld 1993). The second consequence is that Critical Theory is necessarily 
engaged in a discourse on values, since it acknowledges the inscription of knowledge 
in social interests: 
[Critical theory] seeks to understand society by taking a position outside of 
society while at the same time recognising that it is itself the product of 
society. […] it involves a change in the criteria of theory, the function of 
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theory and its relationship to society. […]. It is both an intellectual and a 
social act. (Hoffman 1987:233). 
 Reflexivity, then, is manifested as a cognitive solution, rather than a cognitive 
problem. However, the move from the meta-theoretical to the theoretical might 
explain the adequacy and coherence of Critical Theory, but it does not explain the 
need for its existence. Within a Positivist frame of understanding, theory is justified 
by the social value of knowledge and validated by the paradigm of truth-as-
correspondence. There is no need to go beyond the world of facts as long as one 
believes in the value of facts in-themselves. Outside of this Positivist circle, the need 
to justify the existence of knowledge in the absence of a referential framework of 
correspondence and representation becomes necessary and problematic – it involves a 
validation that is external to knowledge itself.  
 Critical Theory finds this validation in the realm of values and interests, by 
asserting that meaningful knowledge is that which serves human emancipation. 
Critical Theory therefore moves from the meta-theoretical to the theoretical to the 
axiological/normative, by setting human emancipation as the objective and underlying 
legitimacy of theory proper. This was already suggested by Marx’s view that the point 
of Historical Materialism was not merely to describe the world but more importantly 
to change it. ‘The point,’ then, of Critical IR theory  
is not simply to alter the way we look at the world, but to alter the world. It 
must offer more than mere description and an account of current affairs. It 
must also offer us a significant choice, and a critical analysis of the quality and 
direction of life. (Hoffman 1987:244-5).  
Whether grounded in early (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) or late 
(Habermas) Frankfurt School thought, Critical IR Theory is fundamentally committed 
to bridging the gap between facts and values, and between sociological and 
philosophical analysis. Emancipation as an end therefore constitutes the link between 
the cognitive and praxeological aspects of reflexivity: as Critical Theory reveals the 
underlying processes that contribute to making the world as a historically constituted 
order, it also reveals the unfulfilled potentialities of historical development. This 
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entails the rejection of the value-neutral position adopted by Positivism, in favour of 
an activist, engaged social praxis. Accordingly, ‘the question of “what is reliable 
knowledge?” [is] reformulated as “how should we live?”’ (Neufeld 1993:75). 
 Critical Theory thereby manages to escape the danger of nihilism or 
perspectivism that it accuses Postmodernism of having succumbed to. It does so by 
embracing its own historicity. In his anticipation of the tu quoque argument that 
Critical Theory’s criticism of Positivism could be (reflexively) turned against it, 
Robert Cox (1996[1985]:56-7) addresses the ‘troublesome question of the ideological 
nature of thought.’ According to him, the question is 
troublesome insofar as the imputation of ideology may appear to be insulting 
to the positivist who draws a line between his science and another’s ideology. I 
should make it clear that I do not draw such a line; I accept that my own 
thought is grounded in a particular perspective; and I mean no offense in 
pointing to what appears to be a similar grounding in other people’s thought. 
[…]. The troublesome part comes when some scientific enterprise claims to 
transcend history and to propound some universally valid form of knowledge. 
Positivism, by its pretentions to escape from history, runs the greater risk of 
falling into the trap of unconscious ideology.  
The epistemic consistency of Critical thought thereby seems to be preserved, 
on the basis of the dialectical relationship between theory and practice, between 
thought and history: Critical Theory can then be viewed as a socio-intellectual process 
constantly ‘confront[ing] all its statements on the subjective experience, conscious 
and unconscious, of human beings and human groups, with the objective factors 
determining their existence’ (Adorno, 1976[1957]:250) – and, reflexively, its own as 
well. As the process actualizes itself by exploring ‘historical alternatives’ to existing 
power structures, ‘the values attached to the alternatives do become facts when they 
are translated into reality by historical practice’ (Marcuse 2002[1964]:xlii). 
 At the normative level, however, the reflexive gaze confronts Critical Theory 
to the very ideological roots and content of the notion of “emancipation” it promotes. 
As was the case with Marx, emancipation is viewed as universal, applying to 
‘man(kind),’ ‘society as a whole’ (Horkheimer). When translated from the realm of 
individual (post-industrial) societies to the “global” realm of world politics, the 
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subject of emancipation becomes the ‘species’ itself (Linklater 1990:8). Given, 
however, that Critical Theory has been exclusively a Western intellectual product, its 
call for “emancipation” – and the very content and nature of its emancipatory project 
– can legitimately be called into question, at least from the perspective of those whom 
it recognizes as having been or still being “oppressed” or “exploited” by the 
economic, technological, political and cognitive culture of the “capitalist West.” 
Viewed from without the history of the Western theory of knowledge, with its 
enclosed narrative that navigates between Greek philosophy, European 
Enlightenment, and the Postmodern problematiques of Western Modernity and 
disenchantment, on what grounds, then, can Critical Theory claim to re-present and 
represent a universal view of human emancipation?  
While its dialectical epistemology allows it to manage the reflexive gaze at the 
cognitive level, situating Critical Theory both inside and outside its subject-matter, it 
does not, however, provide a consistent answer to its normative stance. In Critical 
Theory’s move from epistemology to axiology, part of its reflexive perspective seems 
to be lost – as if the notion of emancipation were endowed with some sort of greater 
epistemic certainty than all other objects of (historical) human consciousness.  
The Constructivist View 
A second, dominant account of reflexivity in IR theory can be traced back to Hegelian 
thought, but in a significantly different variation on the theme of historical 
knowledge. I propose to identify its starting point with Karl Mannheim’s (1936) 
choice to operate a translation from the Marxist theory of ideology to a proper 
sociology of knowledge. In a sense, Mannheim’s cognitive project branches out more 
coherently from Hegel’s epistemology than Marx and Engels’, whose assertion that 
Hegel’s idealism needed to be turned back on its feet led to a Positivist detour that 
only postponed the development of a historicist alternative to the Positivist theory of 
knowledge. Mannheim confronts the historical, collective knowing subject with the 
difficulty of simultaneously pursuing the normative project of defining the standards 
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of knowledge, and the historical project of identifying the conditions under which 
knowledge becomes possible and meaningful.  
 Mannheimian sociology of knowledge was weakened in the Anglo-Saxon 
world with the rise of Positivism (especially in the U.S.), and the development of 
Mertonian sociology of science, wherein epistemic relativism could be ignored. With 
the development of Constructivism, the “social construction of reality” became a 
central ontological stance of sociology of knowledge, and naturally led to envisioning 
the epistemic problems associated with the self-referentiality of knowledge that were 
non-existent within the representational view. The first classical Positivist distinction 
to suffer from Constructivism was the subject-object dichotomy. If the world as we 
view it is not merely external to us but constructed by our gaze and practice, then 
social reality is necessarily reflective of knowledge and vice versa – knowledge and 
reality become mutually constitutive epistemically, and mutually reflective 
ontologically. The problematique of Constructivist scholarship thus starts with the 
acknowledgment of the ‘reification’ of social reality, namely: 
the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something 
else than human products […]. Reification implies that man is capable of 
forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the 
dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. 
(Berger and Luckmann 1966:89). 
Constructivist IR scholars have adopted this common understanding of 
Constructivism as being first and foremost a different way of understanding the 
nature of reality. They agree, in other words, that Constructivism changes the 
ontological status of social reality by acknowledging its “constructed nature.” All 
Constructivists, then, attempt to reverse this process of reification: they 
aim to “denaturalize” the social world, that is, to empirically discover and 
reveal how the institutions and practices and identities that people take as 
natural, given, or matter of fact, are, in fact, the produce of human agency, of 
social construction. [They] believe that intersubjective reality and meanings 
are critical data for understanding the social world. [They] insist that all data 
must be “contextualized”, that is, they must be related to, and situated within, 
the social environment in which they were gathered, in order to understand 
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their meaning. [They] accept the nexus between power and knowledge, the 
power of practice in its disciplinary, meaning-producing, mode. [They] also 
accept the restoration of agency to human individuals. Finally, [they] stress the 
reflexivity of the self and society, that is, the mutual constitution of actor and 
structure (Hopf 1998:182). 
As far as reflexivity is concerned, however, ‘the mutual constitution of actor 
and structure’ entails different problematiques for Constructivism whether the 
“actors” in question are merely the social agents (individually and collectively) that 
constitute IR’s object of study, or whether they also include IR scholars (individually 
and collectively) as one particular group of social agents. This changes significantly 
the kind of empirical research one is expected – or feels compelled – to pursue within 
IR.  
 If Constructivists focus exclusively on the social constructedness of 
international reality (minus IR scholarship), they are likely to reduce the 
problematique of reflexivity to the social agents they study. A good example is found 
in Alexander Wendt’s (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Wendt starts by 
identifying the relevance of reflexivity in relation to the “double hermeneutic” that is 
specific to the social sciences, i.e., as a problematique that concerns (scientific) 
knowledge-producers (1999:76). The concept then disappears from the book and 
reappears again when Wendt considers ‘the possibility of collective reflexivity at the 
international level’ (1999:376):  
By highlighting the role our practices play in sustaining social kinds, 
therefore, constitutive theorizing enhances our collective capacity for critical 
self-reflection or “reflexivity”. This gives us perspective on our social 
environment and helps us to overcome any false sense of determinism. It also 
opens up the possibility of thinking self-consciously about what direction to 
go in. […] At the individual level to varying degrees we all think reflexively, 
and as the example of Soviet New Thinking suggests even states are capable 
of doing so. The question is this: can the states system achieve reflexivity? 
(Wendt, 1999:375). 
 As illustrated in this excerpt, reflexivity is coherently defined as ‘self-
reflection,’ whether it concerns the observer of social reality or the social agents she 
observes. The two levels remain, however, separated, and reflexivity is here 
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understood as operating at a single level of action/interpretation, namely, knowledge 
in general. This seems to neutralize the problematisation of reflexivity as resulting 
from the “double hermeneutic” – the coexistence and convergence of two levels of 
interpretation (Giddens 1982). Within this perspective, Constructivism’s concern with 
reflexivity can be reduced and restricted to the realm of IR’s object of study without 
ever touching upon the epistemic question of the “social construction of knowledge.” 
In this sense, Constructivists need not be concerned with their own knowledge-
production, if the ontological realm can be divided in such a way that different 
Constructivists can study different aspects of reality, which may or may not include 
IR scholars themselves. In the latter case, reflexivity itself becomes an ontological 
problem of Constructivism, rather than an epistemic principle of Constructivist 
research. Constructivism’s concern for reflexivity is then actualized by developing 
empirical research that focuses on the constructed nature of international “facts,” such 
as anarchy or power, and therefore aims at highlighting the possibility of international 
actors becoming aware of their participation in the reality they conceive as external to 
them. This translates practically into the investigation of such fields of international 
action as diplomacy. 
 The inclusion of (scientific) knowledge as a level of action that can be 
objectivated by Constructivism significantly changes the meaning and status of 
reflexivity within it. Ted Hopf (1998) noted that there are two different kinds of 
Constructivisms in IR – a ‘conventional’ and a ‘critical’ type, the latter being so called 
for its close affiliation with the theoretical and practical concerns of Critical Theory: 
critical theorists self-consciously recognize their own participation in the 
reproduction, constitution, and fixing of the social entities they observe. They 
realize that the actor and observer can never be separated. Conventional 
constructivists ignore this injunction, while largely adopting interpretivist 
understandings of the connectivity of subjects with other subjects in a web of 
intersubjective meaning. The observer never becomes a subject of the same 
self-reflective critical inquiry. […] conventional constructivism does not 
accept critical theory’s ideas about its own role in producing change and 
maintains a fundamentally different understanding of power. (Hopf 1998:184, 
185) 
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Stefano Guzzini provides a good illustration of ‘critical’ Constructivism’s 
view of reflexivity. For him, the fact that both knowledge and reality are constructed 
entails that there are two ‘levels of action’ that need to be interpreted simultaneously: 
the level of ‘common-sense knowledge’ and the level of ‘scientific knowledge.’ 
Guzzini considers that ‘Constructivists must assume [both] scientific and common-
sense knowledge to be socially produced’ and therefore they ‘need to take seriously 
that if science is just another form of human action, both theories of knowledge and 
theories of action have to be understood in connection’ (Guzzini 2000:162). For 
Guzzini, then, a ‘coherent constructivism must approach them in the same 
way’ (Guzzini 2000:170), which means that reflexivity operates not within each level 
of action separately, but at their junction, since conceptually and practically it is not 
possible to separate the processes of knowledge construction from the constructed 
reality within which knowledge is produced. This view entails that Constructivist 
scholars should themselves be concerned with the question of ‘how [it is] possible 
that subjective meanings become objective facticities’ (Berger and Luckmann 
1991[1966:30) within Constructivism itself.  
 These two different understandings of what reflexivity entails for 
Constructivism lead to another important point, which concerns IR scholarship’s 
ethical and deontological stance, i.e., its position with regards to society and its 
existing systems of values. The concerns of “critical” Constructivism naturally 
converge with those of Critical Theory, albeit in a different fashion. As Hopf noted, 
critical theory aims at exploding the myths associated with identity formation, 
whereas conventional constructivists wish to treat those identities as possible 
causes for action. Critical theory thus claims an interest in change, and a 
capacity to foster change, that no conventional constructivist could make. 
(Hopf 1998:184) 
On the one hand, some Constructivists have made their position clear with 
respect to Constructivism’s own engagement in social reality. Emanuel Adler, for 
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example, stated that ‘[a] constructivist “mediative” epistemology  […] is interested 8
neither in emancipation per se, nor exclusively in uncovering the power structures that 
affect the marginalized in history, but in providing better explanations of social 
reality’ (Adler 1997:333-4). While he states that ‘constructivist theory can be both 
“critical” and “problem-solving”, in Robert Cox’s sense’ (Adler 1997:334), its 
“critical aspect” seems to be restricted to its ability to historicise knowledge rather 
than to also politicise it by producing an account of itself that could turn it into a 
reflexive agent of change. On the other hand, those Constructivists who seem, like 
Wendt, to assert the centrality of social change for Constructivism do not feel 
compelled to include IR in their ontological appraisal of the “construction of” 
international politics. Constructivism can therefore perfectly continue to exist without 
ever entailing a discussion of how it contributes to producing a new status quo or of 
affecting society and human practices – including (institutionalised) knowledge. 
The Two Limits of the Reflexive Turn: 
Taking Critical Theory and Critical Constructivism as the two most epistemically 
coherent accounts of reflexivity in contemporary IR literature , a discussion of the 9
limits of reflexivity and the challenges it currently faces becomes more interesting 
and useful. Two specific points will be addressed here, and I will argue that a 
resolution of each separately and both together entails the development of an 
interdisciplinary research program that rests on a different attitude vis-à-vis 
epistemology. 
   
 Adler defines Constructivists as “mediativists” in the sense used by Steve Woolgar, i.e., as 8
“ontological realists who believe that reality is affected by knowledge and social factors.” (Adler 
1997:322). 
 Pragmatism is also a good candidate for reflexive scholarship, but coherently reflexive Pragmatist IR 9
has not yet emerged as a representative school of thought in the discipline, at least not as Critical 
Theory and Constructivism currently are. 
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From Meta-Theory to Theory to Empiry: 
The first problem concerns the translation of reflexivity as an epistemic question into 
the realm of empirical research, and is particularly acute in the case of Critical 
reflexive IR, whose position is best exemplified in the work of Mark Neufeld (1991, 
1993, 1995), its most articulate proponent. Neufeld writes that  
 [reflexivity] can be understood to entail three core elements: (i) self-awareness 
regarding underlying premises, (ii) the recognition of the inherently politico-
normative dimension of paradigms and the normal science tradition they 
sustain, and (iii) the affirmation that reasoned judgements about the merits of 
contending paradigms are possible in the absence of a neutral observation 
language. (Neufeld 1993:54-5; emphasis added). 
More explicitly, 
[r]eflexivity is not a “research programme” designed to provide cumulative 
knowledge about the world of empirical facts or about the world of theory. 
[…]. [It] is a meta-theoretical stance involving (i) a recognition of the 
interrelationship of the conception of “facts” and “values” on the one hand, 
and a community-specific social and political agenda on the other, and (ii) an 
openness to engage in reasoned dialogue to assess the merits of contending 
paradigms (Neufeld 1993:60-1; emphasis added). 
I have highlighted the terms ‘self-awareness,’ ‘recognition’ and ‘affirmation’ 
to make more explicit Neufeld’s definition of what reflexivity does and does not 
entail, and my own take on his position. It is important, first, to refer Neufeld’s stance 
to the general intellectual context in which reflexivity appears in IR literature, and 
more specifically, from a Critical-Theoretical viewpoint, to the importance of this 
notion in addressing the epistemic problem of relativism in IR’s post-positivist era 
(especially in light of the development of Postmodernism). Neufeld’s stress on ‘the 
merits of contending paradigms’ and the possibility of producing ‘reasoned 
judgments’ despite the absence of a ‘neutral observation language’ are to be 
understood within the context of the discussion of the incommensurability of different 
IR paradigms and theories. Reflexivity is then viewed as a positive solution to the 
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problem of the social and philosophical value of knowledge – and truth – against the 
“anything goes” attitude that threatened to replace the flawed certainty of Positivism 
with the nihilist perspective of epistemic relativism. 
Nonetheless, reflexivity remains, for Neufeld, first and foremost a ‘meta-
theoretical stance’ and in this sense is not in itself a ‘research programme.’ This is 
perfectly fine as a definition of what reflexivity is/is not, but if there is any usefulness 
to reflexivity qua meta-theoretical stance, surely it is in its ability to produce a 
‘research programme’ of some sort that takes reflexivity as a starting point for the 
development of empirical knowledge. This is even more important given that Critical 
Theory is concerned with emancipation, i.e., with social change and development. 
Firstly, then, reflexivity cannot be restricted to, or stop at, the mere ‘recognition’ of 
the ‘interrelationship of the conceptions of “facts” and “values”’ and ‘community-
specific social and political agenda[s].’ It cannot be simply about becoming ‘self-
aware’ of the ‘politico-normative’ (Neufeld) or ‘ideological’ (Cox) elements that 
subtend and promote systems of knowledge. It necessarily has to also inform a 
“theory” of the social/international, and therefore lead to the production of a 
significantly different type of empirical knowledge. Secondly, it is not clear what, 
apart from empirical knowledge itself, can produce or justify such ‘self-awareness,’ 
‘recognition’ or ‘affirmation’. Surely, reflexivity itself must result from an empirical 
assessment of how knowledge is subtended by ‘politico-normative’ or ‘ideological’ 
principles. Reflexivity is therefore necessarily produced by and productive of 
empirical knowledge.  
It appears then necessary for Critical Theory to develop a more consistent 
understanding of reflexivity that ties the meta-theoretical “reflexive” stance to the 
theoretical and empirical project of Critical Theory. One way of doing so is to 
translate reflexivity into a methodology for empirical social science. If, for instance, 
reflexivity entails ‘a recognition of the interrelationship of the conception of “facts” 
and “values”’ on the one hand, and a community-specific social and political agenda 
on the other’, this means that this interrelationship should be studied in order to 
produce theoretical frameworks that can objectivate, in a reflexive way, cognitive 
discourses in IR in relation to social and political agendas, and these theoretical 
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frameworks can in turn be used to produce a better understanding of how knowledge 
is constituted at the international level . Reflexivity, then, cannot be viewed as 10
simply an axiomatic point of departure from Positivism, since the nature of the 
statements produced by our reflexive “recognition” of such and such social realities 
must themselves be based on an empirical assessment of how they appear to us, how 
they are produced, and how they can be changed. Therefore, from an internal, 
Critical-Theoretical perspective, as long as reflexivity remains trapped in the realm of 
meta-theory, it can neither produce the type of alternative theory that Critical scholars 
hope to replace Positivism with, nor dynamically inform our historical knowledge of 
the world and of IR in it. The move from meta-theory to theory to empiry is therefore 
necessary.  
This move entails delving into a set of different sociologies that address all the 
realms of reality that are implied in the reflexive turn: a sociology of ideology/ideas/
values, of knowledge and science, of political and economic systems, and of the 
relationships among these different realms of social reality. This is needed to both 
justify the need for reflexivity and its relevance as an underlying premise of social 
science research, and to develop a properly reflexive research program that can situate 
the realm of knowledge/ideas within the realm of praxis and vice-versa. Reflexivity 
therefore necessarily leads to an inter-disciplinary research programme that stretches 
the boundaries of IR proper way beyond any of the limits it has historically reached, 
including during the Behavioralist era. 
From Knowledge to Emancipation 
Another important problem of reflexive scholarship concerns the inscription of 
reflexivity in the realm of ethics. This is manifested in two different utterances. The 
first is the notion of ‘ethical reflexivity’ (Lynch 2008), and the second that of 
‘emancipatory theory’ (Neufeld 1995). In both views, the problem is to provide not 
only a conceptual link between reflexivity as an epistemic stance and the adherence to 
 For an example of how reflexivity can be used as a methodology to study the relationship between 10
conceptions of facts/values and socio-political/academic agendas, see Hamati-Ataya (2011a).
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certain moral values or norms, but also a standard or basis (whether normative or 
empirical) for developing a specifically normative reflexive discourse.  
 The problem of the notion of emancipation has already been mentioned in the 
case of Critical Theory. It is also predominant within Critical Constructivism, which is 
concerned with social change and views reflexivity as a means to producing not 
merely a better social science but also a more moral one – hence the importance of 
“power” in Critical Constructivist IR literature (Guzzini 2000, 2005). The problem, 
then, is that within this view reflexivity entails the adherence to a normative standard 
of emancipation. If reflexivity does not extend to the realm of values, then 
emancipatory theory falls back into a reversed Positivism, which denies the social 
construction of values while asserting the social construction of facts. The question, 
then, is first an ontological one, since it rests on a definition of facts/values that is 
consistent with the production of both a discourse on facts and a discourse on values.
 Whether this entails developing ties with value/normative theory or a more 
anthropological/sociological investigation of human and social systems of values, the 
task remains the same. Insofar as reflexivity is related not merely to a more sound 
(historicist) understanding of reality and of its relation to knowledge, but also to a 
morally meaningful understanding of how knowledge-producers are located in, 
affected by, and productive of, international structures and relations of power, the 
ethical and deontological meaning of reflexivity cannot be ignored. In the case of 
Critical Theory, the problem is obvious because Critical Theory is justified 
existentially and philosophically by the objective of promoting human emancipation – 
whatever it means, but it should mean something specific. For Constructivism, the 
problem may be approached differently whether, as mentioned earlier, IR 
Constructivists are interested in including themselves as objects of study, or simply 
restrict reflexivity to the ontological realm of the construction of knowledge/reality 
from the perspective of international agents. In the latter case, insofar as 
Constructivism is concerned with the processes whereby values become shared by a 
group of agents and start to efficiently define their perceptions of the world and their 
practice in it, it necessarily has to engage in an investigation of how values are 
formed, how they affect knowledge and praxis, and the conditions and processes that 
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govern their evolution. Whether consciously formulated in terms of “reflexive 
scholarship” or not, this approach constitutes the bulk of Constructivism’s (and 
Feminist Constructivism’s) contribution to contemporary empirical research in IR. 
 It is, then, the first approach that needs to be analytically and empirically 
developed within Constructivism. For those Constructivists who also include 
themselves as social constructs, and for whom therefore reflexivity is intrinsically 
about self-referentiality, it is necessary to clearly define Constructivism’s social role. 
The differences observed among Constructivist IR scholars with respect to their 
degree of social and moral engagement are common to all forms of Constructivism, 
which, unlike Critical Theory, is not originally defined qua engaged knowledge/
praxis. Ian Hacking (1999) questions the extent to which Constructivism is in fact an 
emancipatory approach to social reality, by noting that although ‘the idea of social 
construction has been wonderfully liberating’ because of its explicit discourse on the 
non-inevitability of social phenomena, ‘unfortunately social construction analyses do 
not always liberate’ (1999:2). It is therefore, according to him, important not to just 
‘ask for the meaning’ of Constructivism, but to also ‘ask what’s the point’ of it 
(1999:5). 
 Hacking proposes to summarize the Constructivist viewpoint through the 
following series of statements, where X represents that portion of reality that is said to 
be “(socially) constructed”: 
(1) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted; X appears to be 
inevitable. (1999:12) 
(2) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at 
present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 
(3) X is quite bad as it is. 
(4) We would be much better off ix X were done away with, or at least 
radically transformed. (1999:6) 
Statement (0) states ‘a precondition for a social constructionist thesis about X. 
Without (0) there is no inclination (aside from bandwagon jumping) to talk about the 
social construction of X’ (1999:12). Once this precondition is set, all Constructivists 
engage in a type (1) thesis about a specific X. Such theses in IR are at the origin of the 
emergence of Constructivism, as when Wendt posited that ‘anarchy is what states 
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make of it,’ and Onuf that the world is ‘a world of our making.’ Stopping at this stage 
would correspond to a ‘conventional’ Constructivism that aims, as Adler put it, for a 
better type of social explanation – a social theory that understands the socio-historical 
processes that make the world appear as a given. However, as Hacking notes, ‘many 
social construction theses at once advance to (2) and (3),’ although ‘they need not do 
so’: 
One may realize that something, which seems inevitable in the present state of 
things, was not inevitable, and yet is not thereby a bad thing. But most people 
who use the social construction idea enthusiastically want to criticize, change, 
or destroy some X that they dislike in the established order of things (Hacking 
1999:6-7). 
 Depending on how they answer the question “what’s the point” of 
Constructivism, Constructivist IR scholars will define their relation to society 
differently. A move beyond statement (0) will therefore produce different ‘grades of 
commitment.’ Hacking identifies 6 possible attitudes for Constructivists (1999:19-20): 
- the ‘Historical’ – X is a historical construct; 
- the ‘Ironic’ – X is a historical construct, it’s bad, but there’s not much we can 
do about it; 
- the ‘Reformist’ – X is a historical construct, it’s bad, but we can try to make it 
less so; 
- the ‘Unmasking’ – by showing that X is a historical construct, we make it lose 
its ‘authority or false appeal’ [this corresponds to Mannheim’s notion of 
enthüllung or the ‘unmasking turn of mind’ – Mannheim (1952[1925]:140]; 
- the ‘Rebellious’ – X is a historical construct, it’s bad, and we would be much 
better off without it; 
- the ‘Revolutionary’ – X is a historical construct, it’s bad, and we need to 
change the world in respect of X. 
Constructivist IR scholars are often only implicit about their degree of 
commitment or the social value and purpose of Constructivism. Adler’s position may 
clearly be translated as a “Historical” type of commitment, while Wendt’s may be 
located between a “Reformist” or “Unmasking” type. The more Constructivists focus 
on “power” (Guzzini 2005), the more it is likely that they will move beyond type (1) 
theses and towards a “Rebellious” or “Revolutionary” form of commitment. Feminist 
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Constructivist scholarship is a clear example of such an explicit move beyond thesis 
(1) and beyond the “Ironic” or “Unmasking” type of commitment.  
With respect to reflexivity, however, this needs to be combined with another 
important element of Constructivist ontology: the type of X that Constructivists study. 
Hacking (1999:21-22) identifies three important classes of X: ‘objects’ (people, states/
conditions, practices, actions, classes, behaviour), ‘ideas’ (conceptions, beliefs, 
theories), and what he calls ‘elevator words’ (facts, truth, reality, and knowledge). 
Depending, then, on the type of X Constructivists focus on, the type of social 
commitment they espouse will take on a different meaning and will have different 
consequences on the type of reflexivity they uphold. But reflexivity seems to entail 
that X is always about both ‘elevator words’ and something else in international 
reality. Constructivists have therefore to make clear what exactly they want to change, 
and what reflexivity entails in terms of social and moral commitment. Whatever it 
entails, moving beyond type (1) theses requires a definition of what “bad” is, and 
therefore the reference to a specific axiological or normative standard of assessment. 
These questions are not easy to answer. One of the problems of “reflexive 
scholarship” in IR is that it has from the beginning mixed the epistemic/meta-
theoretical understanding of reflexivity with its ethical dimension. This is 
undoubtedly due to the fact that reflexivity appeared more strongly in the writings of 
Critical Theorists, for whom “emancipation” is a built-in requirement of post-
Positivist IR. The connection is made clear by Neufeld, who asserts that reflexive 
theory is emancipatory (Neufeld 1995). Within Constructivism, this link is less 
explicit, and therefore the confusion between the two dimensions of reflexivity is 
made greater – especially when reflexivity is used to address “objects” that are 
already politicised, such as gender or identity. It is, then, not surprising that Feminist 
IR scholars are particularly explicit about reflexively interrogating their own 
“viewpoint” on the world, but, as Patrick Thaddeus Jackson notes (2011: 185-6), they 
yet have to show what methodology they (have) use(d) to do so. 
A “maximalist” commitment to reflexivity requires that the epistemic and 
ethical/deontological levels be coherently articulated. The combination of epistemic 
and ethical reflexivity therefore entails the development of a more systematic and 
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explicit understanding (theoretically and empirically) of the relation between the 
realm of facts and the realm of values. As mentioned earlier, one cannot move to the 
“social construction of facts” while assuming a universal understanding of values: the 
deconstruction that is implied in both Critical Theory and Constructivism requires that 
values be subjected to a historical analysis of their emergence, meaning, and impact 
on social reality. Reflexivity then entails being capable of producing a consistent 
account of values, an account that can serve as a basis for justifying the social value, 
meaning, and objective of scholarly engagement. Only under such conditions can 
reflexivity also prevent scholarship from falling into a non-critical practice of social 
engagement – the values of reflexive scholarship need to be assessed just as much as 
those of the agents IR scholars study. 
Interdisciplinarity from a Reflexivist Perspective: 
Both the move from meta-theory to theory to empiry and the move from epistemic to 
ethical concerns entail a significant re-organization of the relationship between IR and 
the other social sciences – as well as the pure sciences. I will not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive map of the inter-connections between IR as we know it today and all 
the existing sciences, but will rather focus on some specific disciplines that are 
important to open up to within the problematique of reflexivity. 
IR and the Social Sciences 
The first obvious field of inquiry that reflexive scholars should become engaged in is 
the sociology of knowledge and science in general, and the sociology of IR in 
particular. Insofar as reflexivity entails becoming aware of the social processes that 
subtend the production of knowledge and how this knowledge in turn is reflected in 
the practices, beliefs, and commitments of social agents (including IR scholars), 
nothing can be said from within IR’s own doxa. A truly reflexive research programme 
and curriculum should begin with asserting the centrality of the sociology of 
knowledge/science for IR. Just as the “Behavioural turn” was intrinsically inclined to 
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rely on the philosophy of knowledge/science literature to counter its Classical Realist 
predecessor, so is the “reflexive turn” naturally reliant on the corpus of the sociology 
of knowledge/science to counter its Positivist counterpart. The point is also to develop 
a significant research programme that produces knowledge about IR knowledge, and 
not merely imports findings from other disciplines – this is necessary if one is to 
move beyond the “reflexive turn” as a “turn” and into a “reflexive era” proper.  
 The Sociology of IR has significantly developed in the past two decades, 
especially in relation to the discipline’s “American” or “Western” identity, which has 
made it particularly relevant to Feminist, Constructivist, and Post-Colonial IR 
scholars, as manifested in the first volume of the “Worlding Beyond the West” 
Routledge series, edited by Arlene Tickner and Ole Waever (2009). The IR literature 
now includes studies of the patterns of disciplinary reproduction (including the 
reproduction of its internal divisions and parochialism), through IR scholars’ research 
and teaching practices and dispositions, which constitutes an important contribution to 
their own self-understanding. However, one should also mention that some 
sociologies of IR might be more akin to the Reflexivist project (as a “maximalist” 
commitment to reflexivity) than others. For example, it makes a great difference 
whether one studies the discipline within a strictly “Sociology of Science” approach, 
say à la Randall Collins, within a broader Mannheimian “Sociology of Knowledge” or 
through a Bourdieusian, general “theory of practice.” Debating the foundations of the 
Sociology of IR should therefore also become an important concern for reflexive 
scholarship. 
 A second obvious field of inquiry for reflexive scholars is the sociology of 
values and norms. And this does not entail simply a study of how values and norms 
are produced in the international realm, how they affect international relations and 
state behaviour, or how they could be changed. It also entails understanding the 
values and norms that govern IR research itself, so as to translate reflexivity into an 
empirically grounded account of how reflexive scholars are located and involved in 
the production of meaning about international politics, and how their own accounts 
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are subtended by the specific position they occupy in the domestic, cultural, socio-
economic and international settings they operate from .  11
 Reflexivity also entails reversing the separation between the political and the 
international, which has been successfully imposed by mainstream (Neorealist) IR. To 
objectivate the social processes that subtend the production of knowledge, IR scholars 
need to understand that the way they look at the world and the way they produce 
science (and the normative system of meanings and standards that legitimate it or 
make it possible) are dependent on their inscription in specific social settings, whether 
national, sub-national or trans-national, wherein institutional, ideational, socio-
economic and ideological factors operate in a complex way. If the history and 
sociology of science can provide us with the means to objectivate the way these 
factors have affected the emergence of specific concepts, modes of theorizing, and 
methodologies throughout history, as well as their extant social value and meaning, 
then one cannot remain oblivious to how these same factors shape our current 
knowledge. Without a return to social and political theory beyond the current rigid 
disciplinary boundaries of “IR,” reflexivity remains an empty claim that can neither 
be translated into concrete, self-referential statements about the knowledge we 
produce, nor be validated by external observers or future generations of scholars. 
 These three fields of inquiry are of course interrelated, and from the 
perspective of reflexive scholarship, the type of inter-disciplinarity that they define 
may be redefined as a form of intra-disciplinarity. However one may want to identify 
them, reflexivity requires that they also be derived from a Reflexivist philosophy/
theory of knowledge.  
A Return to the Natural Sciences? 
IR has had quite a fluctuating relationship with Epistemology (as a discipline) and 
with epistemology as the realm of inquiry concerned with the nature and standards of 
knowledge and truth. In the Behavioural era, epistemology and the philosophy of 
science replaced political philosophy as the central corpus of IR theory, as an attempt 
 Hence the importance of debating what different sociologies of IR can offer reflexive scholarship.11
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to establish the foundations for “scientific” theorizing within IR. The post-Positivist 
critique of mainstream IR has also been concerned with epistemology, but found its 
cues in the “death-of-epistemology” movement that was best manifested in works 
such as Rorty’s (1979) critique of the correspondence-theory-of-truth. Divorced from 
the more normative concerns of classical Epistemology, post-Positivism opened IR to 
the problem of epistemic and theoretical incommensurability, which Postmodernists 
are quite comfortable with, but which led other post-Positivists to claim the need to 
‘devise new roads to commensurability’ (Lapid 1989:249). This explains why 
reflexivity, which is quite non-existent within Postmodernism, often includes some 
rejection of the “anything goes” attitude of epistemic relativism (e.g., Neufeld 1993, 
1995). If the value of truth is to be preserved, and if truth indeed still means anything 
at all outside of a Positivist frame of reference, then reflexivity itself can only be 
meaningful if there is a value in looking back at one’s modes of theorizing, and of 
comparing them to others. It also means that claims to “truth” – whatever that means 
in a post-Positivist perspective – can be validated somehow, especially claims made 
by different post-Positivisms. 
 But epistemic discussions have led IR to a certain dead-end, as Friedrich 
Kratochwil (2007) argues, and this has undoubtedly weakened post-Positivism against 
the perhaps more flawed, but nonetheless more consistent, system of meaning and 
validation offered by Positivism. I would like to argue that this problem is related to 
IR scholars’ focus on the incommensurability problem as an internal, normative 
question of classical Epistemology. The post-Positivist “turn” was not accompanied 
by a more radical move away from normative epistemology, and remained trapped in 
the logic of comparing paradigms, theories and approaches on the basis of an 
(un)achievable common standard of assessment. Is the alternative to Positivist 
epistemology, then, the abandonment of all epistemic discussions? Certainly not. 
Perhaps only nihilist, or totally relativistic approaches can afford such a position, and 
only if they situate themselves outside of “social science” per se. The alternative is 
rather in a combination of Naturalized and Social Epistemology.  
 Social Epistemology is a normative study of the social dimensions of 
knowledge. Its central question is ‘whether, and to what extent, the conditions of 
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knowledge include social conditions’ (Schmitt 1999:354). While its object of study 
sets it apart from the empirical investigations of the sociology of knowledge, Social 
Epistemology is a necessary complement of the latter, and can provide Reflexivist 
scholarship with a better understanding of how to focus its discussions on the nature 
and validity of knowledge, and with some guidelines for deciding when to resort to 
sociological analyses of knowledge-production/products and when to appeal to 
epistemic-normative analyses.  
 Further away from normative Epistemology, and more interesting for post-
Positivist IR is Naturalized Epistemology (Quine 1969), which considers that 
Epistemology’s objective should be to understand how human beings actually arrive 
at beliefs about the real world, rather than to determine the normative standards of 
knowledge. Naturalized Epistemology is interesting for the social sciences because it 
shifts the classical problems of Epistemology from Philosophy understood in the 
Kantian sense of the ‘tribunal of pure reason’ (Rorty 1979), to the empirical, 
experimental problems of cognitive Psychology. Insofar as reflexivity entails an 
understanding of how one’s own knowledge is produced, and how one can maintain a 
certain standard of “truth” and validity as opposed to the “common knowledge” of the 
social agents one observes, then reflexive scholarship should be interested in 
grounding its epistemic frame of analysis in an understanding of the socio-
psychological and socio-physiological processes that make knowledge possible and 
that constitute (individual, as well as shared) beliefs.  
 The problem, however, is that post-Positivist IR scholarship has 
characteristically been opposed to an engagement with the natural sciences – a more 
or less conscious attempt to reverse the ‘worshipful relationship’ Positivism had 
established with them (Lapid 1989:246). It is therefore worth asking whether 
reflexivity, which is a properly post- or anti-Positivist stance, necessarily entails such 
a divorce with the empirical sciences. After all, even the most radical Constructivists 
deny “universal constructionism” – the notion that it is “ideas all the way down.” 
Some aspects of social reality are not socially constructed, or at least not exclusively. 
And the very notion of a “double hermeneutic” was supposed to highlight the 
difference between the social and the natural sciences, which preserves in the mind of 
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many social scientists the value/validity of the kind knowledge produced by the pure, 
empirical sciences. The point should now be to understand how these two realms are 
interconnected. Sociologists of science have already successfully determined that, 
unlike Mannheim’s original idea, the natural sciences were not completely immune to 
social processes – which made possible such investigations as a “sociology of 
Mathematics,” along with the more general affirmation of the ‘social construction of 
scientific facts’ (Latour and Woolgar 1979). Cognitive scientists also investigate the 
part natural (physiological) and social (cultural) factors play in the development of 
human cognition, and this cannot reasonably be said to be irrelevant to reflexive 
scholarship. It is therefore time to acknowledge that a denial of Positivism’s epistemic 
stance does not entail divorcing the “hermeneutic” sciences from all other forms of 
knowledge. This would indeed be quite a ridiculous intellectual position. It would 
jeopardize Reflexivism’s ability to generate new knowledge and to sustain itself on 
the long term as a dynamic research programme capable of cognitive growth. 
Conclusion: 
Reflexivity After the Reflexive Turn 
It may be useful to end this paper as it started, with Lapid’s 1989 article on IR’s “third 
debate,” and his early assessment of the dangers that faced post-Positivist IR on the 
long run. One of his concerns was that ‘the post-positivist “liberation of theory from 
data” could […] lead us “into the dead end of metatheory”’ (Lapid 1989:249). One of 
the arguments presented in this paper is that the “reflexive turn” has indeed suffered 
from this entrapment of reflexivity within the realm of meta-theory, and that it is now 
necessary to translate reflexivity into a tradition that can produce an empirical, albeit 
non-Positivist, knowledge of world politics. 
 Once we get past the terminological diversity and confusion that surrounds the 
literature of “reflexive scholarship,” the “reflexive turn” indeed should materialize 
into a clear research programme that is founded on a consistent and coherent 
cognitive system, wherein epistemic/ontological, theoretical, methodological, 
empirical, but also ethical and deontological stances derive from a common, 
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Reflexivist approach to knowledge and social reality. The advantage of using the term 
“Reflexivism” to label such a programme is that it refers, more clearly than does the 
generic term “post-Positivism,” to the epistemic and ontological parameters that result 
from the adoption of reflexivity as a specific cognitive doctrine. Within this 
Reflexivist approach, which is capable of responding point by point to Positivism, a 
great variety of theories can be envisaged. It is up to each of them individually to 
define their specific objects of study, their position vis-à-vis human values and 
political agendas, and their inclusion or not of an emancipatory project. The point is 
that within Reflexivism, these choices should be consistent with reflexivity as an 
underlying premise. 
 It is, then, possible to take the “reflexive turn” seriously and to “take” it tout 
court, but this entails moving to the realm of both facts and values, and doing so from 
a Reflexivist theory of knowledge that can produce empirical accounts of what it 
means for IR scholars to be inside and outside of their object, what it means for 
reflexive IR to produce a discourse on world politics, and why reflexivity itself is 
worth discussing and undertaking both in cognitive and moral terms. 
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